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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-NORTH
DAKOTA'S DISORDERLY CONDUCT STATUTE: IS IT
LIMITED TO FIGHTING WORDS, OR
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD AND
VAGUE?*
On the evening of April 10, 1988, Gabriel Nassif telephoned
the Bismarck Police Department on 911 about his car being vandalized.1 Nassif was upset because the police were not investigating the vandalism and threatened the dispatcher, saying that he
had a gun and would take the law into his own hands.2 In
response, three officers were sent to Nassif's residence.3 Seeing
the officers arrive, Nassif left the house and confronted them in his
front yard.4 Nassif was very upset, shouted, and became further
agitated as the conversation with the officers continued.5 Finally,
one of the officers told Nassif that if they could not help him, they
were going to leave. 6 Upon hearing this Nassif shouted: "[Y]ou
fucking son of a bitch, I'm going to go back into the house and get
my shotgun and blow you bastards away." 7 One of the officers
then grabbed Nassif, handcuffed him, and placed him under arrest
for disorderly conduct pursuant to Bismarck City Ordinance sec* This comment addresses only subsection three of North Dakota Century Code
section 12.1-31-01, North Dakota's disorderly conduct statute. In addition, this comment
should be read in light of the recently decided case of City of Bismarck v. Schoppert, Crim.
No. 900263 (N.D. May 7, 1991). In Schoppert, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
jury instructions allowing for a disorderly conduct conviction for uttering words that merely
"inflict injury" upon the addressee, as opposed to words that "incite immediate breach of
the peace," violated the defendant's first amendment rights. Id. at 8-11. The Schoppert
court held that only words that "incite an immediate breach of peace" can be
constitutionally prohibited. Id. at 8.
1. City of Bismarck v. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d 789, 791 (N.D. 1989). Nassif had reported the
incident to the police that morning, but the police had not yet acted on the complaint. Id.
2. Id. Nassif testified at trial that he was heavily sedated at the time of the call as a
result of taking medication. Brief for Appellant at 3, City of Bismarck v. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d
789 (N.D. 1989) (No. 89004) (available at the University of North Dakota Thormodsgard
Law Library).
3. Nassif,449 N.W.2d at 791. The officers were informed of Nassif's threats when they
were dispatched and two of them drew their guns upon arriving at Nassif's residence. Id.
4. Id. Nassif was not expecting three officers and became nervous and frightened
when he saw two of the officers with their guns drawn. Brief for Appellant at 4-5, City of
Bismarck v. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d 789 (N.D. 1989) (No. 89004). All three officers traveled in
separate patrol cars. Id. at 2.
5. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 791. Nassif had shouted threats and warnings during his
telephone conversation with the dispatcher as well. Brief for Appellee at 2, City of
Bismarck v. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d 789 (N.D. 1989) (No. 89004) (available at the University of
North Dakota Thormodsgard Law Library).
6. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 791. Testimony at trial revealed that as many as 20 to 25
people had gathered near Nassif's residence, some as close as 75 feet. Id. at 795.
7. Id. Two officers testified that they felt threatened and were concerned for their
safety. Id. The other officer was already in the parking lot north of Nassif's residence, but
he testified that he also heard Nassif's statement. Id. at 795.
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tion 6-05-01.1 In January of 1989, a jury found Nassif guilty of the
charge. 9
On appeal, Nassif raised, inter alia,10 the following issues: (1)
whether Bismarck City Ordinance section 6-05-01 (1), (3) is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague on its face in that it infringes on
the right of free speech protected by the first amendment;" (2)
whether the evidence sufficiently indicated that his language constituted "fighting words";'" and (3) whether the evidence showed
that he used the words in a public place. 13 The North Dakota
8. Id. at 791. Nassif was charged alternatively with subsections 1 and/or 3 of section 605-01 of the City of Bismarck Code of Ordinances. Id. at 792. The ordinance provides in
relevant part:
DisorderlyConduct: A person is guilty of an offense if, with intent to harass,
annoy, or alarm another person or in reckless disregard of the fact that another
person is harassed, annoyed, or alarmed by his behavior that person:
1. Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior;
3.

In a public place, uses abusive or obscene language, or makes an obscene
gesture, which language or gesture by its very utterance or gesture
inflicts injury or tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
BIsMARcK, N.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 6-05-01(1X3) (1986). The complaint stated
that Nassif had violated this ordinance by using obscene and offensive language and by
threatening the officers with bodily harm, or alternatively by telling the officers that he was
going to blow them away with his gun. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 791-92.
9. Id. The jury did not state the exact subsection under which it found Nassif guilty.
See id.
10. Id. at 792. Nassif also asserted two other issues: (1) that the trial court erred by not
giving his requested jury instruction on entrapment, and (2) that the trial court erred by not
inquiring into his waiver of lack of criminal responsibility defense to determine whether he
made it competently, intelligently, and voluntarily. Id. On the former issue the court held
that there was not sufficient evidence to afford Nassif that instruction. Id. at 796. The
North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case on the later issue, holding
that the trial court should have inquired into his waiver of lack of criminal responsibility
defenses. Id. at 798. For further discussion on the foregoing issues see infra note 144.
11. Nassif,449 N.W.2d at 792. Nassif asserted that subsection (3) of the ordinance was
invalid because it conflicted with state law by prohibiting different conduct than subsection
(3) of the state's disorderly conduct statute. id. at 793. However, a city ordinance may not
supersede state law. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-05 (1985 & Supp. 1989). Therefore, Nassif
believed that the Bismarck ordinance must be read in light of state's disorderly conduct
statute, which he asserted to be unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. Nassif, 449
N.W.2d at 793. The North Dakota Supreme Court construed the state of North Dakota's
disorderly conduct statute, section 12.1-31-01 of the North Dakota Century Code, to be
consistent with the Bismarck ordinance rather than finding that the ordinance superseded
state law. Id. at 794.
The constitutionality of subsection (1) was not properly raised at trial and, therefore,
was not addressed by the North Dakota Supreme Court. Id. at 793 (citing State v. Raywalt,
436 N.W.2d 234, 239 (N.D. 1989); Grand Forks v. Cameron, 435 N.W.2d 700, 702 (N.D.
1989)) (court will not address an issue on appeal when it has not been adequately raised at
the trial court level).
12. Nassif,449 N.W.2d at 792. "Fighting words" are defined as words tending to incite
immediate breach of the peace, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), or
words which carry an inherent power to provoke a violent reaction when spoken to an
ordinary citizen. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 14, 20 (1971).
13. Nassif,449 N.W.2d at 792. A definition of "public place" is conspicuously absent
from both the Criminal Offense Title of the Bismarck Code of Ordinances and the North
Dakota Century Code Penal Code Title. See BISMARCK, N.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 6
(1987); N.D. CENT. CODE tit. 12.1 (1985 & Supp. 1989).
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Supreme Court held that Bismarck City Ordinance section 6-0501(3) was not unconstitutionally overbroad on its face,' 4 that Nassif's language constituted "fighting words,"' 5 and that the language was used in a public place.' City of Bismarck v. Nassif,449
N.W.2d 789 (N.D. 1989).
"Fighting words," as defined by the United States Supreme
Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,'7 are "those words which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."' 8 Chaplinsky involved a Jehovah's Witness who caused a disturbance in the streets of Rochester, New
Hampshire, by passing out literature and making deprecatory religious remarks.' 9 Later, a traffic officer at the scene decided to
escort Chaplinsky to the police station because the crowd was disturbed and threatening violence; however, Chaplinsky was not
14. Nassif,449 N.W.2d at 793. The issue of vagueness was not addressed by the court.
Id. Perhaps the reason for this omission is that the appellant's brief did not address the
vagueness doctrine. See Brief for Appellant at 9-11, City of Bismarck v. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d
789 (N.D. 1989) (No. 89004) (discussion of the first issue, but addressing only the
overbreadth of the statute and not the vagueness).
15. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 794-95. The first amendment to the United States
Constitution provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridgingthe freedom of speech or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). The first amendment is incorporated to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (the first amendment is applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment). The fourteenth amendment provides in
relevant part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of the citizens of the United States." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. However,
"fighting words" are wholly unprotected by the first amendment. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at
572 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940)).
16. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 795. The court found that Nassif had used the words in a
"public place" because the bystanders who were located on nearby public property could
hear Nassif's utterances. Id. at 795-96. For further discussion concerning the public place
issue see infra notes 134-45 and accompanying text, and notes 186-88 and accompanying
text.
17. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
18. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (dictum) (citing Z.
CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 149 (1941)). This dicta has served only to
frustrate first amendment freedom of speech and was unnecessary. Card, Fighting Words
as Free Speech, 58 WASH U.L.Q. 531, 533 (1980). See also Strossen, Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L. REv. 484, 508-10 (1990)
(Chaplinsky "inflict injury" language was dictum, and is no longer good law). The Court
actually accepted the New Hampshire Supreme Court's definition of "fighting words," as
those which are "likely to cause an average addressee to fight." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at
573. The Court stressed further that no words were forbidden except such as have a direct
tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom individually, [the words] are
addressed." Id.
19. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569-70. Chaplinsky was allegedly denouncing religion. Id.
at 570. A group of citizens had previously complained about Chaplinsky's remarks to the
City Marshal. Id. The Marshal explained to them that Chaplinsky was lawfully exercising
his freedom of speech and then warned Chaplinsky of the group's complaint. Id.
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placed under arrest.2 0 On their way to the station, Chaplinsky and
the officer encountered the City Marshal with whom Chaplinsky
began to argue, calling him "a God damned racketeer" and "a
damned fascist."'2 ' Chaplinsky was then arrested for disorderly
conduct and subsequently found guilty of the charge.2 2

On

appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that Chaplinsky's
words were "fighting words" wholly unprotected by the first
amendment.2 3 The Chaplinsky Court stated that "such utter-

ances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may

be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality.

'24

Despite this seemingly expansive lan-

20. Id. See also Notes and Cases, Prohibitionof Offensive Utterances Not Violative of
Right of Free Speech, 2 BILL OF RTs. REV. 224, 225 (1941) (defendant led to police station
because of threatened violence from the crowd).
21. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569-70. Chaplinsky alleged that at first he merely asked
the Marshal to arrest the members of the crowd who had caused the disturbance. Id. at
570. Arguably, the Marshal then cursed him and told him to comply. Id. Chaplinsky also
denied using the Lord's name in vain, but admitted the other remarks. Id.
22. Id. at 569. The New Hampshire statute, as it existed when Chaplinsky was
convicted, provided:
No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any
other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by
any offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his
presence and hearing with intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or prevent him
from pursuing his lawful business or occupation.
See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569 (quoting N. H. P. L. c. 378 § 2 (1926)). Chaplinsky was
convicted in the municipal court of Rochester, New Hampshire for violating the statute
through the use of his words to the City Marshal. Id. After exhausting his appeals in the
state courts, Chaplinsky appealed to the United States Supreme Court alleging, inter alia,
that the statute was invalid as a proscription of free speech, as well as being vague and
indefinite. Id. at 571.
23. Id. at 572. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, stating that the New
Hampshire Supreme Court had narrowly construed the statute under which Chaplinsky
was convicted to proscribe only words that had the "characteristic of plainly tending to
excite the addressee to a breach of the peace." Id. at 573.
Precedent for the Court's decision was Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. Cantwell was a Jehovah's Witness who played a tape to two
Catholics that described the Roman Catholic Church in an offensive light. Cantwell, 310
U.S. at 300. Cantwell's conviction of inciting a breach of the peace was overturned by the
Court because the tape was not directly aimed at the two listeners and a "clear and present
danger of riot" was not present. Id. at 308-10. The "clear and present danger" language
used by the Court in Cantwell was taken from the Court's decision in Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 311. The Court in Schenck was analyzing a
letter written and circulated by Schenck that opposed the draft when the United States was
at war with the German Empire. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The
Schenck Court stated that the "question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Id. at 49.
The Court believed that even "[tihe most stringent protections would not protect a
[person] in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing panic." Id.
24. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (citing Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED
STATES 149 (1941)). The exact words used by Chafee in his book are as follows:
The true explanation is that profanity and indecent talk and pictures, which
do not form any essential part of any exposition of ideas, have a very slight social
value as a step to truth, which is clearly outweighed by the social interests in
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guage, the fact that Chaplinsky is the only Supreme Court decision to uphold a "fighting words" conviction illustrates that the
exception has been narrowly applied. 5
Indicative of the this narrow application is Bachellar v. Maryland,2 6 in which the defendants' conviction under Maryland's dis-

orderly conduct statute was reversed."

Bachellar involved

order, morality, and the training of the young, and the peace of mind of those
who hear and see.
Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 150 (1941).

25. Gard, supra note 18, at 534. In the case of Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1
(1949), the Court was presented with the question of whether speech that "stirr[ed] the
public to anger, invit[ed] dispute, or [brought] about a condition of unrest, or creat[ed] a
disturbance" was nevertheless protected by the first amendment. Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 3 (1949). The petitioner in Terminiello spoke to a group euphemistically called
the Christian Veterans of America. Id. at 2-3. Terminiello's speech was violently antiSemitic, as represented by him asking the group to consider if they had to even wonder
why the Jews were persecuted by Hitler. Id. at 20 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Allegedly, an
extremely violent crowd of 1500 people had gathered outside to protest the speech. Id. at
16 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Ice picks, stones and bottles were thrown at police officers.
Id. at 15-16 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Terminiello was arrested and convicted under a
Chicago breach of the peace ordinance. Id. at 2. At trial, the jury was instructed that
"breach of the peace" could be behavior that "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, and
brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or if it molests the inhabitants in
the enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing alarm." Id. at 3. Finding that instruction
overbroad because it encompassed more than "fighting words," the Court ruled the
ordinance unconstitutional. Id. at 6. The Court stated:
[Speech] may indeed serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger.
It is nevertheless protected unless shown likely to produce a clear and
present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. .

.

. There is no room under our

Constitution for a more restrictive view.
Id. at 4 (citations omitted).
26. 397 U.S. 564 (1970). The case of Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), decided
prior to Bachellar,illustrates the Court's position that only words tending to cause a violent
reaction may be punished. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. at 315, 331 (1951) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Feinerinvolved a young college student who made a speech on a street corner
in Syracuse, New York, advocating the use of violence by African American people against
whites for the purpose of obtaining equal rights. Id. at 316-17. The crowd of some eighty
people, consisting of both whites and African Americans who were listening to Feiner,
began pushing and milling around. Id. at 317. After twice warning Feiner to end his
speech because of the crowd's reaction, the police arrested him for breach of the peace. Id.
at 318. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, after conviction in the state courts,
Feiner's conviction was affirmed. Id. at 321. Relying primarily on Cantwell v. Connecticut,
Chaplinsky's predecessor, the Court stated:
It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used as an instrument for the
suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, when as here the
speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement
to riot, they are powerless to prevent a breach of the peace.
Id. at 320-21. Although Feiner does not address a pure "fighting words" situation, the
Court did reiterate the fact that a person's words may be constitutionally suppressed only
when shown to arouse a clear and present danger of unlawful action. Shea, "Don't Bother
to Smile When You Call Me That"- Fighting Words and the FirstAmendment, 63 KY. L.J.
1, 11 (1975).
27. Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 571 (1970). The statute existing at that time
prohibited "acting in a disorderly manner to the disturbance of the public peace, upon any
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Vietnam War demonstrators in the streets of Baltimore, Maryland,

who carried or wore signs bearing legends such as "Peasant Emancipation, Not Escalation," "Make Love not War" and "Stop in the

Name of Love." 2' A crowd had gathered to watch the demonstration, and some of the individuals in the crowd resented the protest. 29 The Court stated that "[c]learly the wording of the placards
was not within the small class of 'fighting words' that under
Chaplinsky are likely to provoke the average person to retaliate
and thereby cause a breach of the peace." 30 The Court noted further that under the United States Constitution, public expression

of ideas that are merely offensive may not be prohibited. 3 '
A unique case in which the Supreme Court narrowed the
3"
application of "fighting words" is Cohen v. California.

The

defendant in Cohen walked through the Los Angeles County
Courthouse corridor wearing a jacket with the words "Fuck the

Draft" inscribed on the back, which were meant to convey his
deep-seated opposition to conscription during the Vietnam War.3 z

Cohen was arrested and convicted of violating a state breach of
the peace statute, because the state court believed it was reason-

ably foreseeable that others might have reacted violently against
public street... in any [Maryland] city .. ." Id. at 564 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 27
§ 123 (1967 Repl. Vol.)).
28. Id. at 566. Baltimore police and United States Marshals were present for the march
because they had been informed of the demonstration in advance. Id.
29. Id. at 567. One individual objected sharply to receiving a leaflet that the
demonstrators were distributing. Id. The demonstrators later moved their protest to a
recruiting station where they staged a sit-in. Id. at 568. At the end of the day when they
were asked to leave, the demonstrators refused and as a result were ejected by United
States Marshals. Id. After being ejected, the demonstrators began to sing anti-war songs
and allegedly sat or lay on the ground. Id. at 568-69. The testimony conflicted as to
whether the demonstrators had been thrown out and held down by the marshals while
pending the arrival of police vehicles, or whether the demonstrators were escorted out and
willfully sat or lay down. Id. at 568. In any event, the reaction of onlookers was virtually
the same as when the demonstrator's were marching and handing out leaflets. Id. at 569.
The demonstrators were subsequently convicted by the City of Baltimore municipal court
for violating the disorderly conduct statute, and on appeal, the Special Appeals Court
affirmed. Id. at 565. The trial judge had instructed the jury that they could find the
demonstrators guilty on the grounds of either inciting or offending the crowd through their
conduct or by refusing to obey police orders to move. Id.
30. Id. at 567. The Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the
demonstrators' constitutional rights could have been impinged because the jury may have
convicted the demonstrators on the basis of their views concerning the Vietnam War and
the impact that view had the spectators, rather than convicting the demonstrators for their
conduct. Id. at 571.
31. Id. (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)).
32. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). One of the important implications of this case is the fact that
obscene language is removed from the "fighting words" exception to free speech. Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 106, 107 (1973).
33. Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 16 (1971). Cohen did not engage in any violent
behavior, threats, or unusual noise. Id. at 16-17 (citing People v. Cohen, 1 Cal. App. 3d 94,
97-98, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 505 (1959)).
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Cohen physically, or by attempting to remove his jacket. 34
Reversing Cohen's conviction, the United States Supreme Court
held that the words on Cohen's jacket were not "fighting words,"
because they were not directed at any specific person, nor could
anyone reasonably regard the words to be directed specifically at
them. 35 Furthermore, there was no showing of a clear and present
danger of violence, and Cohen did not intend to create a disruption.36 The Cohen Court's application of the "fighting words"
exception is considered to be the contemporary standard, because
it concentrates on both the character of the words spoken and the
specific surroundings of the utterance.
This approach was exemplified in Hess v. Indiana,3 8 in which
the defendant, Hess, in an anti-war demonstration on the campus
of Indiana University, hollered "[w]e'll take the fucking street
later. . . -39 Hess was immediately arrested by a sheriff pursuant
to Indiana's disorderly conduct statute. 40 Appealing to the United
States Supreme Court after exhausting his appeals in the Indiana
courts, Hess asserted, among other things, that his conviction
34. Id. at 17. The statute existing at that time prohibited "maliciously and willfully
disturb[ing] the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or person by offensive conduct." Id.
at 16 (quoting CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 415 (West 1968)). Cohen was convicted by the trial
court and that decision was upheld by the court of appeals. Id. However, review was not
granted by the Supreme Court of California. Id. at 17. Cohen properly invoked the United
States Supreme Court's jurisdiction by contending that, as the statute was being applied to
him, it was an infringement of his first amendment right to free speech. Id. at 18.
35. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20. The state asserted several theories as to why it could
suppress Cohen's message, including its interest in guarding morality. See id. at 21.
Dismissing that argument, the Court noted that oftentimes people are captives when
outside the sanctity of their own homes, and when in a public place such as the county
courthouse they can "effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by
averting their eyes" from the objectionable stimuli. Id. at 21-22.
36. Id. at 20-21. Therefore, the Court held that the state could not criminalize Cohen's
actions notwithstanding use of the "four-letter expletive." Id. at 26. Justice Harlan
recognized that "while the particular . . . word being litigated here is perhaps more
distasteful than most others, it is nevertheless true that one man's vulgarity is another man's
lyric." Id. at 25. Furthermore, the emotive quality of a word is often the reason compelling
the speaker to choose it. Id. at 26.
37. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-10, at 850-51 (2d ed. 1988).
California's "fighting words" statute now prohibits any person from using "offensive words
in a public place which are inherently likely to provoke an immediate violent reaction."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (West 1988).
38. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
39. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973). The defendant may have hollered,
"We'll take the fucking street again." Id. (emphasis added).
40. Id. Indiana's disorderly conduct statute existing at that time provided, in relevant
part:
Whoever shall act in a loud, boisterous or disorderly manner so as to disturb
the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or family, by loud or unusual noise, or
by tumultuous or offensive behavior, threatening, traducing, quarreling,
challenging to fight or fighting, shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct ....
Id. at 105 n. 1 (quoting IND. CODE § 35-27-2-1 (1971); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-15-10 (West
Supp. 1972)).
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should be overturned because the statute, as applied to him, was
an unconstitutional infringement of free speech.4" Finding that, at
worst, Hess' words amounted to only future advocacy of illegal
conduct, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the words
could not withstand "fighting words" scrutiny because they were
not directed toward any particular individual or group.42 In addition, the Court substantiated its position by looking at context, stating that the government's ability "to shut off discourse solely to
protect others from hearing it is ...

dependent upon a showing

that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essen' 43
tially intolerable manner.

Recently the Supreme Court has considered whether flag desecration, as a form of symbolic expression, falls within the "fighting
words" exception to free speech.44 In Texas v. Johnson, the
defendant, Johnson, was convicted under Texas' flag desecration
statute for burning the United States flag as a means to communicate his contempt for the actions of the Republican Party in
renominating Ronald Reagan as a presidential candidate after he
had served one term in office. 45 After noting that the only evidence offered by the state was that persons had been offended by
Johnson's expression, the Court stated that the expressive conduct
was not encompassed by the small class of "fighting words" enunciated in Chaplinsky.46 The Court found it implausible that a reasonable person could consider Johnson's actions to be a direct
personal insult or an invitation to engage in personal combat,
despite the offensiveness of the conduct.41
41. Id. at 105-06. Hess asserted also that the statute was vague and overbroad on its
face. Id.
42. Id. at 107-08 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)). The Court noted also that any assertion that the words
were obscene would be untenable in the wake of the Cohen holding. Id. at 107.
43. Id. at 108 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21(1971)). The Court noted
further that words must produce imminent disorder before the state could punish Hess. Id.
at 109.
44. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 110 S.Ct..
2404, 2407 (1990). Symbolic expression exists when there is "an intent to convey a
particularized message and ... [where] the likelihood [is] great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it." Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
45. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399-400. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of
Texas affirmed Johnson's conviction whereafter he appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals where his conviction was reversed. Id. at 400. The United States Supreme Court
then granted certiori. Id. at 402. The court instructed that, to determine whether an
action taken with reference to the flag was expressive, consideration must be given to the
context in which the action took place. Id. With that in mind, the Court found that
Johnson's actions were "sufficiently imbued with elements of communication . . . to
implicate the First Amendment." Id. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,
409 (1974)).
46. Id. at 408. The state conceded that no actual breach of the peace had occurred. Id.
47. ld. at 409. The constitutionality of the Flag Desecration Act of 1989 was
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The foregoing cases exemplify the evolution of the "fighting
words" exception to free speech by demonstrating the Supreme
Court's shift in emphasis from simply the content of the words spoken, such as in Chaplinsky, to an emphasis on both the content
and context of the colloquy.4 This has narrowed the "fighting
considered by the Court in the case of United States v. Eichman, 110 S.Ct. 2404, 2406-07
(1990). The 1989 Act replaced the old flag desecration act which Congress intuitively
thought to be unconstitutional in light of Johnson. United States v. Eichman, 110 S.Ct.
2404, 2407 n.3 (1990). The appellees in Eichman had been convicted under the 1989 Act
for setting fire to United States flags in protest to various governmental policies, and for
protesting the very passage of the 1989 Flag Protection Act. Id. at 2406. The district courts
had found the Act unconstitutional as applied to the appellees in the light of the Johnson
decision. Id. The government invited the Eichman Court to place flag burning outside the
protection of the first amendment, just as was done with "fighting words" in Chaplinsky.
Id. at 2406. Finding that the government's interest in protecting the flag could not justify
infringement on first amendment rights, the Court declined the invitation and held the Act
unconstitutional as applied because it "suppresse[d] expression without concern for its
likely communicative impact." Id. at 2408-09 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320
(1987)).
The Flag Protection Act of 1989 provides in relevant part:
(aX1) Whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns,
maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
(2) This section does not prohibit any conduct consisting of the disposal of a
flag when it has become worn or soiled.
(b) As used in this section, the term 'flag of the United States' means any flag
of the United States, or any part thereof, made of any substance, of any size, in a
form that is commonly displayed.
18 U.S.C.A. § 700 (Supp. 1990).
The holdings in Johnson and Eichman leave the constitutionality of section 12.1-07-02
of the North Dakota Century Code in serious doubt, it being identical to the old flag desecration Act which Congress repealed in light of theJohnson holding. Compare N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-07-02 (1985) (prohibits a person from "knowingly cast[ing] contempt upon any
flag of the United States by publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning, or trampling
upon it") with 18 U.S.C.A. § 700 (repealed 1990) (prohibited "knowingly casting contempt
upon any flag of the United States by publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning, or
trampling upon it").
Furthermore, the outcomes of Johnson and Eichman have created both public outcry
and a response by President Bush calling for a constitutional amendment that would protect the flag. In the Aftermath of Johnson and Eichman: The Constitution Need Not be
Mutilated to Preserve The Government's Speech and Property Interests in the Flag, B.Y.U.
L. REV. 577, 579 (1990). However, as one author notes, "it is folly to reach for the heavy
artillery of the amending process." Tribe, Protect It - And Ideas, New York Times, July 3,
1989, § 1, at 19, col. 1. Tribe suggests that a new statute be created that "extend[s] to
anyone who intentionally defaces the flag, in public or in private[,]" without "singling out
those occasions when [the flag is] destroyed publicly or in a manner that expresses contempt." Id.
48. TRIBE, supra note 37, § 12-10, at 852. One author believes that there are now four
elements which must be satisfied before words will lose their constitutional protection
under the contemporary "fighting words" doctrine. Gard, supra note 18, at 536. Gard
states that:
First, the utterance must constitute an extremely provocative personal
insult, a factor requiring a judicial analysis of the content of the expression.
Second, the words must have a direct tendency to cause an immediate violent
response by the average recipient. Third, the words must be uttered face-to-face
to the addressee. Fourth, the utterance must be directed to an individual, not a
group.
Id. (emphasis added). Card asserts that the doctrine has no place in our present society
that is dedicated to the freedom of speech. Id.
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words" exception to such an extent that the Court often applies
the doctrines of overbreadth and/or vagueness to invalidate statutes rather than addressing the "fighting words" issue.49
The premise of the overbreadth doctrine is the Supreme
Court's concern about the chilling effects overbroad statutes have
on the freedom of speech.5° This premise divorces normal standing requirements and allows litigants to challenge a statute
because of judicial conjecture or assumption that the very existence of an overbroad statute may cause others not before the
court to forbear from speech that is protected by the first amendment.5 ' The Court believes that the chilling effect an overbroad
statute has on free speech clearly outweighs the possible harm to
society of permitting speech that is unprotected. 52
The overbreadth doctrine in the context of first amendment
freedoms was developed initially by the Supreme Court in Thornhill v. Alabama. 3 The Court stated that a statute is overbroad
when it "does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area
of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps within its ambit other
activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of

freedom of speech.... "54 In Thornhill, the petitioner, Thornhill,
was arrested for loitering and picketing, pursuant to a state code
which forbade such actions when intended to influence people
from transacting business with an entity. 5

Finding that the stat-

ute abridged the liberty of discussion concerning labor disputes
49. See, e.g., Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 467 (1987) (Texas statute proscribing
obstruction of a police officer overbroad); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 134
(1974) (Louisiana disorderly conduct statute held to be overbroad); Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518, 520 (1972) (Court affirmed a finding that Georgia's disorderly conduct statute was
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague).
50. Note, Overbreadth Review and the Burger Court, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 532, 535
(1974). Although the government may have a valid societal interest when enacting an
overbroad statute, that interest will not justify an infringement upon first amendment

entitlements. Id.
51. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). The Supreme Court's
overbreadth premise has been criticized because it requires belief in "the fiction that
people are aware of the context of the statutes under which they live." Note, supra note 50,
at 546.
52. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612.
53. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
54. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,97 (1940). The existence of such a statute causes
a continuous and pervasive restraint of free speech. Id. at 97-98.
55. Id. at 91-92. The statute in question broadly proscribed a person from doing
essentially anything to hinder a business entity. Id. (quoting ALA. ST. CODE § 3448 (1923)).
Thornhill was a member of the Union which had called a strike at the company in
which he was successful in persuading one man to return home. Id. at 94. There was no
evidence of threats or harsh words. Id. at 94-95. Therefore, Thornhill objected to the
charge, claiming that the statute was repugnant to the United States Constitution in that it
deprived him of, inter alia, his freedom of speech. Id. at 92-93. After being convicted by
the Alabama Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because
of the important first amendment implications involved. Id. at 93.

1991]

CASE COMMENT

133

and that neither a clear and present danger of a breach of the
peace nor an invasion of privacy existed, the Supreme Court found
no justification for such a sweeping proscription and reversed
Thornhill's conviction.'
Subsequent to Thornhill, the Court failed to articulate a standard that could be used to evaluate a statute on overbreadth
grounds, until its decision in Broadrick v. Oklahoma. 7 Among the
decisions prior to Broadrick was Gooding v. Wilson,5 8 in which the
Court held that a Georgia statute, criminalizing the use of opprobrious words or abusive language, was unconstitutionally overbroad, because it was not limited to words that would incite an
immediate breach of the peace.5 9
Gooding involved a group of picketers outside Corps Headquarters of the United States Army who were opposing the Vietnam War.' Police attempted to move the picketers away from
the front door and a scuffle erupted. 6 1 The defendant, Wilson,
then said to one of the officers: "White son of a bitch, I'll kill you.
You son of a bitch, I'll choke you to death.""2 Wilson appealed his
conviction, asserting that the Georgia statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.63 The United States Supreme Court
found that the Georgia courts had not properly construed the statute, and therefore, held the statute unconstitutional because it was
not limited to "fighting words." 64
56. Id. at 104-06.
57. 413 U.S. 601 (1973). The Court's neglect in setting clear guidelines for application
of the overbreadth doctrine has been criticized, in one sense, because it causes institutional
tensions through the interventional device of facial scrutiny by the judiciary. Note, supra
note 50, at 533-34. However, in another sense the doctrine is a catalyst for exercising first
amendment freedoms, because it removes the chilling effect of broad legislation and
encourages lawmakers to enact carefully written laws when first amendment rights are at
stake. Id.
58. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
59. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972). The statute existing at that time
provided: "Any person who shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and in his
presence ... opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace
...shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Id. at 518-19 (quoting GEORGIA CODE ANN. § 266303 (1953)).
60. Id. at 519 n.1. The picketers blocked the door so that inductees could not enter.
Id.
61. Id. The police had previously asked the picketers to move. Id.
62. Id. at 519-20 n.1. Evidence indicated that Wilson assaulted and battered one of the
officers. Id.
63. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 519-20. After exhausting his appeals in the state court system
of Georgia, Wilson was granted federal habeas corpus relief in the federal court system,
where his conviction was overturned. Id.
64. Id. at 525-28. The district court found that the statute left the standard of
interpretation wide open to improper application, unlike the construction of the New
Hampshire statute in Chaplinsky, and the Supreme Court agreed. Id. at 528. Specifically,
the Court noted that definitions of the words "opprobrious" and "abusive" gave them
greater range than "fighting words." Id. at 525. In effect, the Court substantially narrowed
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In the Gooding analysis, the Court again failed to articulate a
standard to be used in determining statutory overbreadth. 65 In his
dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger pointed out the Court's
lack of proper judicial analysis and guidance, stating that a statute
should be invalidated only if it had substantial potential for
improper application and thus a significant likelihood that first
amendment speech will be deterred.6
Persuaded by this
emphatic dissent,67 the Court curtailed the scope of the doctrine
in its next opportunity to do so.8
Broadrick v. Oklahoma,6 9 the seminal case in contemporary
overbreadth analysis, involved an overbreadth challenge to an
Oklahoma statute that proscribed political activity by state civil
servants.7 ° The servants were charged with engaging in partisan
political endeavors among their co-workers. 7 1 The servants
asserted that the statute was overbroad because it could conceivably reach such political activity as the wearing of political paraphernalia and the use of bumper stickers. 72 Distinguishing
between statutes which regulate only speech and those which regulate both speech and conduct, the Court stated that the latter
have been subjected to less exacting overbreadth scrutiny.73 The
Court held that when a statute that regulates both speech and conduct is challenged, its overbreadth must be real and substantial.74
Applying this standard, the Court found that the statute as construed was not substantially overbroad, and therefore not unconstitutional, since the alleged chilling effect it had on free speech,
i.e., proscribing the wearing of political buttons and the displaying
the definition of "fighting words" to its actual holding in Chaplinsky, rather than allowing a

conviction based on the Chaplinsky dictum. Strossen, supra note 18, at 509.
65. See Gooding, 405 U.S. at 534 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (mechanical application of
overbreadth doctrine by majority).
66. Id. at 530-31 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger also joined Justice
Blackmun in dissent. Id. at 534 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting). Both were upset about the
majority's significant reliance on a 66-year-old Georgia decision that was decided thirty-odd
years before Chaplinsky. Id. at 535. They felt the Georgia statute was being condemned
simply because Georgia courts had not yet had a chance to adjust to modem day
overbreadth analysis. Id. at 535-36.
67. See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine,83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 859
(1970) (calling for a substantial overbreadth requirement).
68. Note, supra note 50, at 536. Despite the Court's move to a substantial overbreadth
requirement, Gooding still preserves its vitality in the context of "fighting words." See
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133 (1974) (reaffirming Gooding).
69. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
70. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 602 (1973). The Oklahoma statute is similar
to the Federal Hatch Act which proscribes political activity by federal civil servants. See id.
71. Id. at 610. The servants conceded that, as applied to them, the statute was
constitutional. Id.
72. Id. at 609-10.
73. Id. at 615-16.
74. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
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of bumper stickers, was outweighed by the state's interest in regulating political activity in an evenhanded way.7 5
In Lewis v. City of New Orleans,7 6 decided just one year after
Broadrick, the Court had before it a challenge to a City of New
Orleans ordinance that regulated pure speech, as opposed to the
Broadrick statute that regulated both speech and conduct.7 7
Lewis involved a confrontation between a black Woman and a
police officer after the woman's son had been arrested and was
being taken to the police station. 78 Although the litigants' versions
of the conversation contradicted sharply, the evidence revealed
that Mrs. Lewis was upset that the police had her son, and yelled
"You god damn m.f. police - I am going to [the Superintendent of
Police] about this."'7 9 The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed
Lewis' conviction under the ordinance, stating that "[t]he [ordinance's] proscriptions are narrow and specific - wantonly, cursing, reviling, and using obscene and opprobrious language" and
were thus limited to "fighting words."" ° On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court held that, as construed by the Louisiana
Supreme Court, the New Orleans Ordinance violated the first
amendment. 8 ' The Court stated that nothing in the Louisiana
Supreme Court's opinion limited the words in the ordinance to
"fighting words" which "by their very utterance inflict injury or
75. Id. at 616-18. The Court formed this conclusion by analyzing the Oklahoma State
Personnel Board's construction of the statute and the Oklahoma Attorney General's
Opinion, which interpreted the relevant language of the statute. Id. The requirement of
substantial overbreadth is also applied to "pure speech." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
770-71 (1982). Ferberinvolved the conviction of a bookstore owner for violation of a New
York statute proscribing the distribution of material depicting sexual performances of
children under the age of 16. Id. at 751-52. The Court found that only a "tiny fraction" of
material protected by the Constitution was proscribed and, therefore, upheld the
conviction over a facial challenge to the statute. Id. at 773-74.
76. 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
77. See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132-34 (1974). The ordinance
provided:
'It shall be unlawful and a breach of the peace for any person wantonly to
curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or with
reference to any member of the city police while in the actual performance of
his duty.'
Id. at 132 (quoting NEW ORLEANS, LA., ORDINANCES 828 M.C.S. § 49-7 (1972)).
78. Lewis, 415 U.S. at 131 n.1. Mr. Lewis and his wife were following the patrol car
transporting their son when they were intercepted by another patrol car and pulled over.
Id.
79. Id. Lewis denied the officer's version of the conversation but the Municipal Judge
did not believe her. Id. Lewis' husband testified that the officer's first words were "[L]et
me see your god damned license. I'll show you that you can't follow the police all over the
streets." Id. Lewis alleged that she did not direct any profanity at the officer. Id.
80. City of New Orleans v. Lewis, 263 La. 809, 269 So.2d 450, 456-57 (1972). The
United States Supreme Court had previously remanded the case for reconsideration in light
of the its holding in Gooding. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972), remanded,
269 So.2d 450 (La. 1972), prob.juris. noted, 412 U.S. 926 (1973), rev'd, 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
81. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 131-32 (1974).
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tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. '8 2 Thus, the
Court found the ordinance to be facially invalid on overbreadth
8 3
grounds because it could be applied to protected speech.
Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion in Lewis, in which
he suggested that a higher standard for "fighting words" should be
applied when an officer of the law is the object of the speech.' In
particular, he stated that a police officer is trained and expected to
"exercise a higher degree of restraint" than a normal citizen and
would not likely respond contentiously to "fighting words." s For
example, Justice Powell thought it highly unlikely that, in the present case, a physical confrontation would have broken out between
a police officer and a middle-aged woman. 8 Justice Powell also
noted that, as to the ordinance in question, an officer could easily
abuse his authority to arrest, and the arrestee could be convicted
by a court believing the officer's version of the incident over the
arrestee's. 87
In the recent City of Houston v. Hill case,' the Supreme
Court recognized Justice Powell's concerns as the basis for its decision in finding a Houston, Texas ordinance substantially overbroad.8 9 The ordinance essentially prohibited any speech that
would hinder a police officer while executing his duties.9" Hill, the
82. Id. at 133 (quoting Gooding, 405 U.S. 518, 525 (1971), quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
83. Id. at 134. In reaching their conclusion, the Court reaffirmed its decision in
Gooding. Id. at 132-33.
84. Id. at 134-35. Justice Powell also wrote a concurring opinion when the court
remanded the case for reconsideration. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972),
remanded, 269 So.2d 450 (La. 1972), prob.jut. noted, 412 U.S. 926 (1973), rev'd, 415 U.S.
130 (1974). In that concurrence, Justice Powell wrote:
[The] issue in a case of this kind is whether "fighting words" were used.
Here a police officer ... was called a 'g-- d--- mf----' police.
If these words had been addressed by one citizen to another, face to face
and in a hostile manner, I would have no doubt that they would be "fighting
words." But the situation may be different where such words are addressed to a
police officer trained to exercise a higher degree of restraint than the average
citizen.
Id. at 913-14 (Powell, J., concurring) (city MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.1 comment 14
(Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961)).
85. Lewis, 415 U.S. at 135 (quoting Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972)).
86. Id. This argument is consistent with the Court's holding in Cohen where it
concentrated on both the content of the words and the surrounding circumstances. See
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); TRIBE, supra note 37, § 12-10, at 850-51.
87, Lewis, 415 U.S. at 135. Justice Powell intimated that police officer's might use the
ordinance to create facts that would allow the officers to arrest the individual. See id.
88. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
89. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1987).
90. Id. at 455. The city argued that the ordinance did not inhibit speech but rather
banned "core criminal conduct." Id. at 459. However, language in the ordinance making it
illegal to "strike" or "assault" a police officer had been stricken and, therefore, as it
remained the ordinance made it "unlawful for any person to... in any manner oppose,
molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman in the execution of his duty." Id. at 460-61
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appellee, observed two Houston police officers talking to one of his
friends. 9 ' In an attempt to sidetrack the officers, Hill shouted,
"[W]hy don't you pick on someone your own size?"9 " When asked
by one of the officers if Hill was interrupting him in his capacity as
a police officer, Hill responded that he was.9 3 Hill was arrested
pursuant to the ordinance for "wilfully or intentionally interrupt[ing] a city policeman . . . by verbal challenge during an
investigation."9 4
Applying the Broadrick substantial overbreadth requirement,
the Court found that the ordinance "criminalize[d] a substantial
amount of constitutionally protected speech, and afford[ed] the
police unconstitutional discretion in enforcement. '9 5 The ordinance had not been narrowly written or construed to prohibit only
"fighting words." 9 6 The Court recognized that the First Amendment protects "a significant amount of verbal criticisms and challenges at police officers .....-0 The Court noted further that
"[t]he freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge
police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal
characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police
state."9 The Hill Court also reaffirmed its policy of invalidating
laws that grant police open-ended discretion to arrest individuals
(quoting HOUSTON, TX, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 34-11(a) (1984)). Thus, the Court found
that the statute prohibited speech directed at an officer during his duties. Id. at 461.
91. Id. at 453.
92. Id. at 454. The incident occurred in a homosexual neighborhood, id.at 453, and
the Court noted that sexual preference may have motivated the police to arrest Hill. Id. at
459 n.7.
93. Id.
94. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 454 (1987). Hill was acquitted of the offense.
Id. He subsequently filed suit in federal district court seeking, inter alia, a declaratory
judgment that the Houston Ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on its
face and as it had been applied to him. Id. at 455. The district court found that the
ordinance was not vague because the word "interrupt" was sufficiently understood to mean
stopping or causing one to pause. Id. at 456.
95. Id. at 466.
96. Id. at 465. The Court was urged to abstain from using overbreadth to find the
ordinance unconstitutional because limiting constructions were "readily available" that
would limit the ordinance's application. Id. at 467. However, the Court refused to abstain,
noting its strong position against overbroad statutes that infringe on the freedom of speech.
Id. at 467-68.
The North Dakota Supreme Court was presented with an issue almost identical to Hill
in City of Grand Forks v. Cameron. 435 N.W.2d 700 (N.D. 1989). The court had before it a
Grand Forks City Ordinance that provided: "Every person who wilfully delays or obstructs
a public officer in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his office, shall upon
conviction thereof, be punished as herein provided." Id. at 701 (quoting GRAND FORKS,
N.D., CrrY CODE § 9-0205 (1987)). An issue presented was whether the foregoing statute
was unconstitutional in light of the Hill decision. Id. at 701-02. However, the court did not
address the constitutional question because it was not properly preserved at trial. Id. at
702. The court did construe the ordinance to be consistent with a state law that prohibited
only physical obstruction of a police officer. Id. at 702.
97. Hill, 482 U.S. at 461.
98. Id.
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for using words that simply annoy or offend them. 99 Thus, if such a
statute or ordinance is neither written nor construed to be limited
to "fighting words," it will invariably be held unconstitutional on
an overbreadth doctrine challenge.' 0 0
The similar yet distinct doctrine of vagueness may also be
used to challenge a statute and render it unconstitutional. 10 A
statute is found to be vague when it "either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application
,
"12
A statute that is vague carries the same risk of suppressing free speech as does a statute that is overbroad.10 3 This is
true in the first amendment context, not because the statute
invades protected speech by language that sweeps too broadly, as
in the case of overbreadth, but rather, because a person of common intelligence is not fairly notified of what speech is proscribed
or permitted.0 4 Because of this infringement on first amendment
rights, litigants are allowed to raise the vagueness question of a
statute even though, as applied to their expressions, the statute
may not be vague.10 5 Also, vague and indefinite statutes permit
police officers, prosecutors and other government employees to
arbitrarily and injudiciously pursue their individual predilections,
which is the predominant reason the Supreme Court of the United
States voids statutes for vagueness.'0 Furthermore, although the
99. Id. at 465. In effect, the ordinance granted the Houston police discretion to make
arrests based on the content of the speech. Id. at 465 n.15. The Court found such
discretion to be repugnant to the freedom of speech, particularly because it tempted the
officer to arrest the speaker rather than correct what the speaker was upset about. Id.
100. See, e.g., Hill, 482 U.S. at 467 (statute not authoritatively construed to be limited
to "fighting words" or other unprotected speech, and therefore, unconstitutionally
overbroad); Lewis, 415 U.S. at 134 (same); Gooding, 405 U.S. at 528 (statute as construed
not limited to fighting words, and therefore, unconstitutionally overbroad and vague). But
cf. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (statute as construed was limited to "fighting words," and
therefore, valid).
101. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241. 249-50 (1967).
102. Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
103. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 619-20 (1971). A law that is either vague or
overbroad can be stricken; both are not required. Id.
104. Cf. TRIBE, supra note 37, § 12-31, at 1034 (first amendment vagueness doctrine
not dependent on fair notice).
105. Coates, 402 U.S. at 619-20. Comments to the Model Penal Code section on
disorderly conduct explain that the distinctions between vagueness and overbreadth often
overlap and become blurred in the context of first amendment rights. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 250.2 comment 4, at 338-39 n.45 (1980). The overlap necessarily results because a statute
which is vague will normally be susceptible to overbreadth challenge due to its vagueness.
Id.
106. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S
566, 574-75 (1974)). "[Glenerally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a
penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people
can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Id. In Kolender, the Court was presented with
the issue of a facial challenge to a disorderly conduct statute that prevented persons from
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Supreme Court allows some vagueness in criminal laws, it is less
amicable0 7 to such laws when they abridge the freedom of
speech.1

These views are reflected in the aforementioned cases of
Gooding 0 8 and Hill.' 9 In Gooding, the words "opprobrious" and
"abusive" in Georgia's disorderly conduct statute did not withstand vagueness scrutiny by either their ordinary and common
meaning, or by the construction given them by Georgia courts." 0
Therefore, finding that the statute was easily applied to limit more
than "fighting words," the Court held it unconstitutional."' Similarly, the Court in Hill was urged to abstain from holding the
Houston ordinance unconstitutionally overbroad because a limitwandering on the street unless they carried a "credible and reliable" source of
identification. Id. at 353. As it then existed, the statute allowed conviction for persons:
'Who loiter[] or wander[] upon the streets or from place to place without
apparent reason or business and who refuse[] to identify [themselves] and to
account for [their] presence when requested by any peace officer so to do, if the
surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the
public safety demands such identification.'
Id. at 353 n.1 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 647(e) (West 1970)). The California
Court of Appeals had construed the statute to read that the identification source must be
"credible and reliable" and provide "a means for later getting in touch with the person who
has identified himself." Id. at 356-57 (quoting People v. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 438,
108 Cal. Rptr. 867, 872-873 (1973)). The Court found that such a construction "furnished a
convenient tool for 'harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials,
against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure."' Id. at 360 (quoting
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972), quoting Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940)). In addition, the Court found that, as construed, the statute
granted police unrestricted discretion to arrest and charge persons. Id. (quoting Lewis v.
City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130,135 (1974)). These findings compelled the Court to hold
the statute unconstitutionally vague because it promoted arbitrary enforcement by prosecutors and police. See id. at 362. The Court was particularly emphatic about the full discretion granted to the police by the California Court of Appeals. Id. at 360.
107. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 n.3 (1975). See also Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (vague law that abuts upon first amendment freedoms operates to
inhibit exercise of those freedoms). In Rose, the Court was determining whether a
Tennessee statute that prohibited "crimes against nature" was unconstitutionally vague.
Rose, 423 U.S. at 49. The defendant in Rose was convicted pursuant to the statute for
forcing a woman to submit to oral copulation. Id. at 48. On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court stated that a statute must reasonably define what it proscribes in order to
comply with vagueness standards. Id. at 49. Elaborating, the Rose Court stated that
"[e]ven trained lawyers may find it necessary to consult legal dictionaries, treatises, and
judicial opinions before they may say with any certainty what some statutes may compel or
forbid." Id. at 50. However, the Court in Rose stopped short of requiring that standard
when a statute threatened the fundamental right of free speech. Id. at 50 n.1 (citing Smith
v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-573 (1974)).
108. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) (quoting Coates v. Cincinnati, 402
U.S. 611, 619-20 (1971)).
109. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 471 n.22 (1987).
110. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 524-25. The Court relied primarily on two Georgia decisions
decided before Chaplinsky. Note, Gooding v. Wilson: Where From Here?, 26 Sw. L.J. 780,
785 (1972). A comparison of those decisions with the New Hampshire decisions considered
by the Court in Chaplinsky indicates that a standard of narrow construction must be
applied to statutes restricting the freedom of speech. Id.
111. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 528. The Court reiterated the fact that a statute that does
not give proper notice is vague. See Note, supra note 110, at 783.
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ing construction, placing an intent requirement in the ordinance,
might have narrowed its scope.' 1 2 However, the Court refused
because such a construction might
have caused vagueness, leading
13
to further arbitrary arrests.
In City of Bismarck v. Nassif,l 14 the North Dakota Supreme
Court upheld the arrest and conviction of Gabriel Nassif, and in so
doing, took a step in the development of the "fighting words"
exception to free speech in North Dakota." 5 In Nassif, the court
was forced to construe subsection three of the State's disorderly
conduct statute, because Nassif contended that subsection three of
Bismarck City Ordinance section 6-05-01 was in conflict with subsection three of the state statute, and therefore, invalid."' The
basis for Nassif's contention was that the language in the Bismarck
City Ordinance".7 was limited to "fighting words," but subsection
three of the state statute prohibiting speech did not contain such
limited language."" Thus, Nassif had a plausible argument, and
112. See Hill, 482 U.S. at 467. Justice Powell, in his dissenting opinion, also thought the
majority should remand the case to allow for a limiting construction on the ordinance. Id.
at 481 (Powell, J., joined by O'Conner, J., and joined in Parts I and II by Rehnquist, CJ.,
concurring in the judgement in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell thought that a
construction requiring proof that a person intended to obstruct an officer would narrow the
scope of the ordinance. Id. However, he intimated that construing the ordinance might
not cure its vagueness. See id.
113. See Hill, 482 U.S. at 471 n.22. The majority affirmed the court of appeal's finding
that the statute was not vague. Id. at 456-58. However, the majority noted further that
allowing a limited construction such as that asked for by Justice Powell could raise
independent vagueness questions because such an intent requirement was not self-evident
from the literal reading of the ordinance. Id. at 471 n.22.
114. City of Bismarck v. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d 789 (N.D. 1989).
115. Id. at 794. Subsection three of North Dakota's disorderly conduct statute
provides:
Disorderly Conduct. A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, with
intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person or in reckless disregard of the
fact that another person is harassed, annoyed, or alarmed by his behavior, he:
3. In a public place, uses abusive or obscene language, or makes an obscene
gesture.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-01(3) (1985).
116. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 792-93. For the text of the BISMARCx, N.D., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 6-05-01(3) (1986) see supra note 8.
117. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 793 ("tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace").
118. Id. Section 12.1-01-05 of the North Dakota Century Code prohibits a city
ordinance from superseding a state defined offense. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-05 (1985).
The statute provides:
Crimes defined by state law shall not be superseded by city or county
ordinance or by home rule city's or county's charter or ordinance. No offense
defined in this title or elsewhere by law shall be superseded by any city or county
ordinance, or city or county home rule charter, or by an ordinance adopted
pursuant to such a charter, and all such offense definitions shall have full force
and effect within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of home rule cities
or counties. This section shall not preclude any city or county from enacting any
ordinances containing penal language when otherwise authorized to do so by
law.
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since the court previously had not construed subsection three of
the state disorderly conduct statute,11 it was forced to do so,
or in
120
invalid.
Ordinance
City
Bismarck
the
rule
the alternative,
Rather than holding the Bismarck City Ordinance invalid, the
North Dakota Supreme Court simply used Nassif's argument as a
vehicle to limit subsection three of section 12.1-31-01 of the North
Dakota Century Code to the same offense as the Bismarck City
Ordinance explicitly defined. 12 1 The court stated that the language of subsection three of the Bismarck disorderly conduct ordinance clarified the particular words it prohibited and therefore
literally expressed what words subsection three of the state disor22
derly conduct statute is now construed to prohibit.1
After judicially repairing the legislative overbreadth of subsection three of the state's disorderly conduct statute, the court
next addressed the issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to
find that the language Nassif used amounted to "fighting
words."' 3 During the confrontation with the officers in his front
Id. Nassif argued that if the ordinance superseded state law it had to be ruled invalid

and the offense [The Bismarck City Ordinance] should then be construed to be consistent
with the definition provided by the state law. Nassif,449 N.W.2d at 793 (citing BISMARCK,
N.D., ORDINANCES § 6-01-02 (1986) (prohibits a city ordinance from conflicting with state
law); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-05 (1985 & Supp. 1990)). Nassif believed that once the
Bismarck City Ordinance was construed to be consistent with the state statute, the ordinance was overbroad and vague just as the state statute, because neither would then have
the limited "fighting words" language enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in
Chaplinsky. See id.
119. See State v. Miller, 388 N.W.2d 522 (N.D. 1986) (defendant challenged the
constitutionality of section 12.1-31-01(3) of the North Dakota Century Code, but had not
properly raised the defense at trial, thus precluding him from raising it on appeal).
120. See Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 793-94.
121. Id. at 794.
122. Id. at 794-95. After noting that the additional language of the Bismarck ordinance
immunized it from unconstitutional virus, the court "construe[d] the state statute to
prohibit the same offense [which the ordinance prohibited] and limit[ed] it to that offense"
because -[the ordinance] literally expresses what the state statute must be construed to
include to be constitutional." Id. at 795. Thus, as construed, section 12.1-31-01(3) of the
North Dakota Century Code now reads:
Disorderly Conduct: A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, with
intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person or in reckless disregard of the
fact that another person is harassed, annoyed, or alarmed by his behavior, he:
3. In a public place, uses abusive or obscene language, or makes an obscene
gesture, which languageor gesture by its very utterance or gesture inflicts injury
or tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 792-94 (emphasis added to indicate additional language as
construed).
123. Id. at 795. The questions of whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a
conviction for use of "fighting words" and whether the act occurred in a public place,
pertain specifically to a conviction under the Bismarck disorderly conduct ordinance. See
id. at 794-95.
Nassif made three contentions regarding this issue: (1) "that the evidence was
insufficient to show that his words by their very utterance, inflicted injury or tended to
incite immediate breach of the peace;" (2) that causing the officers to be annoyed or
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yard Nassif shouted, "You fucking son of a bitch, I'm going to go
back into the house and get my shotgun and blow you bastards
away."

1 24

Relying on the United States Supreme Court decisions in
Chaplinsky and Cohen, the North Dakota Supreme Court held

that Nassif's words were "fighting words," defined as "those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary
citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely
to promote violent reaction 25 . . . or [which] tend to incite an

immediate breach of the peace.' 1 2 6 Further, the court recognized
27
that such words are not protected by the first amendment.

The court also discussed whether the fact that Nassif had

directed these words to police officers was relevant. '2 The North
Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged that Justice Powell, in
Lewis v. City of New Orleans,12 9 had suggested that a police officer
is expected to exercise a higher degree of restraint than an ordi-

nary person.' 30 Elaborating on that suggestion, the court referred
to City of Houston v. Hill,13 ' and recognized that the first amendment protects criticisms of and challenges to police officers "unless
shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious
substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoy-

ance, or unrest.' 1 32 Espousing that standard, the North Dakota
Supreme Court found that Nassif's threat to get his gun and "blow
[the

police

33

officers]

away"

was

sufficient

to

uphold

his

conviction. 1

The court next addressed the issue of whether the words were
offended does not elevate that his words to "fighting words" and (3) that there was no
evidence that his words affected the bystanders. Id. at 794. Nassif had the burden of
proving that the evidence revealed no reasonable inference of guilt when viewed in the
light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Id. (citing Grand Forks v. Cameron, 435 N.W.2d
700, 702 (N.D. 1989); State v. Lawenstein, 346 N.W.2d 292, 293 (N.D. 1984)).
124. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 791.
125. Id. at 794 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)).
126. Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). Here, the
court appears to adopt a more narrow definition of "fighting words" than when it construed
subsection three of the state statute to be limited to the same offense as the ordinance,
because the ordinance includes the language "inflicts injury" as well as "tends to incite an
immediate breach of the peace." See id. at 792 (quoting BISMARCK, N.D., ORDINANCES § 6-

05-01(3) (1986)).
127. Id. at 794.
128. Id. at 795. Nassif asserted that police officers should be expected to exercise a
higher level of restraint. Id.
129. 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
130. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 795 (quoting Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130,
135 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)).
131. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987).
132. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 795 (quoting City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461
(1987), quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
133. Id.
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spoken in a public place, which is a specific element of subsection

three of the disorderly conduct offense. 134 Nassif contended that
since he was in his own front yard when he spoke the words, the
event did not occur in a public place. 135 The North Dakota
Court had not yet had the opportunity to address such an
Supreme
36
issue. 1

The court relied on an Iowa Supreme Court case, State v. Leonard, 37 for guidance.'13 The Leonard court decided what consti-

tutes a public place in relation to a charge of "disturbance of the
public peace and quiet."'139 The defendant in Leonard telephoned
a city clerk from his home and used obscene language.' 40 The
Leonard court found the public place element of the offense satisfied because the main office of the city clerk is a public place and
because someone other than the clerk had inadvertently heard the
call.'4 1 Thus, the Iowa Supreme Court believed that the offense
the words were received, not from
occurred at the location where
42
where they were uttered.'
Following that rationale, the North Dakota Supreme Court
found particularly relevant that twenty to twenty-five people had
gathered near Nassif's residence, some possibly as close as seventyfive feet, that Nassif was being extremely loud and was heard by
one of the officers who was standing forty feet away, and that an
officer standing in a parking lot immediately north of Nassif's resi-

dence heard Nassif's threat.'1 3 Given these facts, the court found
that the evidence, viewed in a light most favoring Nassif's conviction, indicated that the bystanders located on public property
must have heard Nassif, and therefore, the act occurred in a public
134. Id. Pursuant to subsection three of North Dakota Century Code section 12.1-3101, a person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, by his behavior, he: "In a public place, uses
abusive or obscene language .. " N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-01(3) (1985).
135. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 795. A public place is defined as:
A place to which the general public has a right to resort; not necessarily a
place devoted solely to the uses of the public, but rather a place which is in point
of fact public rather than private, a place visited by many persons and usually
accessible to the neighboring public (e.g., a park or public beach). Also, a place
in which the public has an interest as affecting the safety, health, morals, and
welfare of the community. A place exposed to the public, and where the public
gather together or pass to and fro.
BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 644 (5th ed. 1983).
136. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 795.
137. 255 Iowa 1365, 124 N.W.2d 429 (1963).
138. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 795.
139. State v. Leonard, 255 Iowa 1365, -, 124 N.W.2d 429, 431-33 (1963).
140. Id. at -, 124 N.W.2d at 431.
141. Id. at -, 124 N.W.2d at 433.
142. See id.at __, 124 N.W.2d at 433.
143. Nassif,449 N.W.2d at 795.
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place. 14 4 Thus, the court adopted the view that the place where
the offense occurred is determined by the public or private nature
of the place where the words are heard, not from where they are
spoken.

1 45

Because Nassif is the first North Dakota Supreme Court decision to discuss subsection three of section 12.1-31-01 of the North
Dakota Century Code, the analysis of the case and construction of
the statute provide novel guidance concerning that subsection's
application. 46 This is especially significant for those practicing
law in such North Dakota municipalities as Fargo, Grand Forks,
and Minot, which have disorderly conduct ordinances that are
identical to the state disorderly conduct statute. 14 7 However, the
Nassif court may have failed to limit subsection three of North
Dakota's disorderly conduct statute to prohibit only "fighting
144. Id. at 795-96 (the fact that Nassif was on his private property when the incident
occurred was irrelevant). The court concluded its analysis by addressing Nassif's claims of
entrapment and error by the trial court by not inquiring into his waiver of lack of criminal
responsibility. Id. at 796-98.
At trial, Nassif had requested an instruction on entrapment, contending that the police
had entrapped him by provoking him into a higher state of agitation even though they
knew he was in an emotional state. Id. at 796. Only "when a law enforcement agent
induces the commission of an offense, using persuasion or other means likely to cause
normally law-abiding persons to commit the offense" does entrapment occur. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-05-11 (1985). The court found no evidence indicating that the officers caused
Nassif's conduct and thus found no error on the part of the trial court concerning this issue.
Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 796 (Nassif had contended that three officers arriving at the scene
and their refusal to give him their badge numbers had prompted his reaction).
Before trial, the City of Bismarck requested, and was granted, an order that Nassif
submit to a mental health examination. Id. at 796-97. Nassif then waived his defense of
lack of criminal responsibility. Id. at 797. On appeal, Nassif contended that it was error for
the trial court not to inquire into this waiver to determine whether or not it had been made
competently, intelligently, and voluntarily. Id. The court reversed and remanded the
decision on this issue, finding that before accepting a waiver of a defense that involves a
choice that will inevitably have important personal consequences, the trial court must first
make an inquiry to determine whether the waiver was in fact made competently,
intelligently, and voluntarily. Id. at 797-98. The North Dakota Supreme Court appears to
have adopted the view that the decision is one for the defendant to make. See id. at 797.
However, before this decision should be accepted, the trial court must first decide if the
defendant is competent to stand trial, and second, it must ascertain that the defendant's
choice was made intelligently and voluntarily. Id. at 797. An ascertainment such as this can
only be made after the defendant has been made aware of all available alternatives and
their ramifications, both pro and con. Id.
145. Id. at 795-96.
146. See State v. Miller, 388 N.W.2d 522, 522-23 (N.D. 1986) (defendant's request to
narrowly construe North Dakota Century Code section 12.1-31-01(1X3) was denied because
the issue was not properly raised at trial). See also State v. Laufenburg, 99 N.W.2d 331
(N.D. 1959) (defendants were arrested under prior law that proscribed wilfully committing
an act that grossly disturbs public peace). Section 12.1-31-01 of the North Dakota Century
Code consolidates prior statutes that dealt with such matters as public fighting, obscene
language, and unreasonable noise. Special Project, North Dakota CriminalCode Hornbook,
50 N.D.L. REv. 639, 735 (1974).
147. See FARGO, N.D., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10-0301 (1989); GRAND FORKS, N.D., CITY
CODE § 9-0201(1987); MINOT, N.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 23-15 (1990). Subsection
three of each of those ordinances provide:
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thus leaving it overbroad and unconstitutional.149 In

addition, subsection three may be void on vagueness grounds as
15 0
well.
Concerning the overbreadth issue, the court noted Nassif's
concession that the language, "tends to incite an immediate
breach of the peace," contained in subsection tlree of the Bismarck ordinance, was limited to "fighting words" and therefore
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to harass, annoy, or
alarm another person or in reckless disregard of the fact that another person is
harassed, annoyed, or alarmed by his behavior, he:
3. In a public place uses abusive or obscene language, or makes an obscene
gesture[.]
FARGO, N.D., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10-0301(3). See GRAND FORKS, N.D., CITY CODE
§ 9-0201(3); MINOr, N.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 23-15(3). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.131-01(3) (1985), infra, note 164.
148. Nassif,449 N.W.2d at 794 (court was attempting to harmonize the statute with
the constitution and provide uniformity in criminal laws throughout the state of North
Dakota).
149. See id. at 793-94. The North Dakota League of Cities has drafted a model code of
ordinances to provide a means by which local governments can properly codify municipal
laws throughout the state. MODEL MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE CODE Forward (N.D. League of
Cities 1987). The Model Code was developed "to assist governments in North Dakota in
bringing about a more systematic, up-to-date, and clearly drafted code of municipal
ordinances." Id. at Intro. The subsection of the Model's disorderly conduct code
prohibiting "fighting words" provides:
A person is guilty... if with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person
or in reckless disregard of the fact that another person is harassed, annoyed or
alarmed by his behavior, he:
b. In a public place, uses abusive, insulting or offensive language, or an
abusive, insulting or offensive gesture, under circumstances in which such
language by its very utterance or gesture, is likely to cause or provoke a
disturbance or breach of the peace.
Id. at ch. 13, Art. 4, Div. 2, § 13.0403(lXb). This subsection appears to track the words
that the United States Supreme Court in Chaplinsky held could be constitutionally proscribed. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (accepting the definition of New Hampshire Supreme court: "Derisive and annoying words can be taken as
coming within the purview of the statute ... only when they have [the] characteristic of
plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace.").
150. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1971) (statute that purportedly has been
narrowly construed by the state's supreme court may still be subject to overbreadth and
vagueness challenges if not limited to fighting words). Cf. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S.
2
451, 471 n.2 (1987) (construction of ordinance must be self-evident to avoid vagueness).
Although Nassif raised the vagueness question on appeal, the court conspicuously failed to
discuss that doctrine as it related to subsection three of the state statute, but rather, simply
attempted to construe that subsection to not be overbroad. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 793-94.
The court was careful to note, however, that Nassif had not properly preserved the issue of
whether subsection (1) of the statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 793-94. The court then
failed to carefully consider the vagueness question after having noted in its consideration of
whether the issue of subsection (1) had been reserved, that Nassif had stated "'[tjheState
Statute is vague." Id. at 792 (emphasis added). However, Nassif failed to discuss the
doctrine is his brief. See Brief for Appellant at 9-11, City of Bismarck v. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d
789 (N.D. 1989) (No. 89004) (discussing the constitutional aspects of the statute, but
addressing only the overbreadth of the statute and not the vagueness).

146
constitutional. 51 '

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:123

The court then construed subsection three of

the state statute to be limited to the same offense as is limited by
the ordinance without analyzing the literal reading of the ordinance or the judicially construed reading of the statute. 15 2 However, the reading of the statute as construed and the literal reading
of the ordinance indicate that both allow a disorderly conduct
arrest for the use of abusive or obscene words or gestures that
merely "inflict injury," as opposed to "incit[ing] immediate breach
of the peace.' 5 3 Thus, a complication in the court's analysis exists
because the court does not address whether the language "inflicts
injury" is overbroad."M If the Nassif court specifically intended to
construe the statute to prohibit only language or gestures that
must incite immediate violent reaction, then the overbreadth of
5
the statute may have been cured.1
However, language that merely "inflicts injury" is much different from language that creates a violent response from the
addressee, and appears to be constitutionally protected. 1 5 6 As the
United States Supreme Court has articulated, only words that
carry the inherent power to provoke violent reaction 5 7 or that
immediately incite a breach of the peace may be suppressed as
unprotected "fighting words."' 5 8 Although the Chaplinsky Court
stated that "fighting words" are those that "inflict injury or tend to
151. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 793. It does not appear that Nassif conceded, or even
mentioned, that the language "inflicts injury" was constitutional. See id.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has recognized that the overbreadth doctrine
prohibits laws that criminalize constitutionally protected conduct. State v. Tibor, 373
N.W.2d 877, 880 (N.D. 1987). The Tibor court also recognized that a litigant need not have
standing to challenge a statute on either vagueness, id. at 880 n.3, or overbreadth grounds
when the statute proscribes freedom of speech. Id. at 881.
152. Nassif,449 N.W.2d at 794. It appears that the court may have simply overlooked
the fact that the ordinance contained the words "inflicts injury." See id.at 793-94.
153. Id. at 794 (court construes statute to limit the same offense as the ordinance, but
does not specify what type of offense is prohibited by the "inflicts injury" language). See id.
at 792 (quoting subsection three of Bismarck City Ordinance § 6-05-01, which proscribes
language that "inflicts injury or incites immediate breach of the peace").
154. See Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 793-94 (the language "inflicts injury" is not considered
in the court's analysis under its constitutionality discussion). The court simply used Nassif's
concession that the "fighting words" portion of the ordinance was constitutional, id.at 793,
and then limited the statute to prohibit the same offense as the ordinance without
discussing the "inflicts injury" language. Id. at 794.
155. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). That specific
intention, however, is not evident from the court's opinion. See Nassif,449 N.W.2d at 79394.
156. See Gard, supra note 18, at 533, 581 (hurt feelings and indignation are not
significant enough to proscribe first amendment rights). See also Strossen, supra note 18, at
509 (laws that restrict "fighting words" must be limited to utterances which will incite
immediate violence); TRmE, supra note 37, § 12-10, at 850 n.5 (explaining that the "fighting
words" doctrine must be narrowly construed).
157. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
158. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S at 572.
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incite an immediate breach of the peace," 159 the "inflict injury"
portion of that statement has been undermined by the subsequent
cases of Cohen and Gooding.'6° Thus, although the North Dakota
Supreme Court may have been attempting prudently to construe
subsection three of the state statute to not be overbroad, further
litigation may be needed to confirm that result.'
Also, litigation may be necessary to determine whether subsection three of the statute is unconstitutionally vague.16 The
North Dakota Supreme Court has stated that a requirement of the
vagueness doctrine is "that the statute provide adequate warning
as to the conduct it proscribes."' 6 3 Subsection three of North
159. Id. (emphasis added). See Gard, supra note 18, at 533 (Chaplinsky dicta
"bedevils" first amendment).
160. Strossen, supra note 18, at 509; MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.2 comment 4(d), at
345 (1980). "Both Cohen and Cooding are based on the proposition that the prevention of
violent response by the addressee is the only acceptable rationale for regulating offensive
speech in a public place." Id. The commentary points out that North Dakota included a
subsection in its disorderly conduct statute similar to the Model Code prohibition of
".abusive language." Id. at n.79 (citing N.D. CENr. CODE § 12.1-31-01(3)). The commentary
then notes that other states have endeavored to limit the breadth of their "fighting words"
statutes, so that they specifically and unmistakably "punish only such language as is
inherently likely to move the addressee to violence." Id. The commentary notes that this is
wise in light of constitutional precedents. Id. One such statute noted by the commentary is
Arizona's. Id. at n.80. Subsection (AX3) of Arizona's statute provides:
A. A person commits disorderly conduct if, with intent to disturb the peace
or quiet of a neighborhood, family or person, or with knowledge of doing so, such
person:
3. Uses abusive language or gestures to any person present in a manner
likely to provoke immediate physical retaliationby such person[.]
AMuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2904(AX3) (1989) (emphasis added to indicate preciseness
of statute). Juxtaposing subsection three of Arizona's statute with subsection three of North
Dakota's statute exposes that North Dakota's lacks the necessary preciseness of a statute
attempting to limit "fighting words." Compare ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2904(AX3)
(1989), supra with N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-01(3) (1985) ("In a public place, uses abusive
or obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture.").
161. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972) (statute that has been purportedly
narrowly construed by the state's supreme court may still be subject to overbreadth
challenges if not limited to "fighting words"); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130,
133 (1974) (same).
162. Cf. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 45, 471 n.22 (1987) (construction must be self
evident or vagueness could arise).
163. State v. Johnson, 417 N.W.2d 365, 368 (N.D. 1987) (Johnson court was not
considering a sensitive first amendment issue, but rather, whether the word "explosive"
was vague).
In determining whether adequate warning is given, the North Dakota Supreme Court
views the statute as if it were a reasonable man who is subjected to its terms. Johnson, 417
N.W.2d at 368. In State v. Woodworth, the court stated that "[tihe test of definitiveness of a
statute is met if the meaning of the statute is fairly ascertainable by reference to similar
statutes or to the dictionary, or if the questioned words have a common and generally
accepted meaning." 234 N.W.2d 243, 246 (N.D. 1973). By applying that test to subsection
three, it appears that the dictionary definitions and general meanings of the words
"abusive" or "obscene" do not definitively indicate that they are words that "tend to incite
immediate breach of the peace" as the Nassif decision has construed them. Nassif, 449
N.W.2d at 794 (construing statute to be limited to same offense as Bismarck ordinance). See
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 6, 981 (2d col. ed. 1980). Webster's New World
Dictionary defines "abusive" as "coarse or insulting in language," id. at 6, and "obscene" as
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Dakota's disorderly conduct statute does not appear to meet this
"adequate warning" requirement because, as construed by the
Nassif court, it proscribes expressions not suggested even
remotely by the literal reading of that subsection. 64 Furthermore, by not adequately warning what conduct it proscribes, the
statute also may fail to "establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement," which the North Dakota Supreme Court also
requires of a statute,165 and which the United States Supreme
Court has stated is the most prominent aspect of the vagueness
doctrine.1'6
Illustrating that subsection three of the statute may be unconstitutionally vague are recent decisions from New York, the state
from which North Dakota's disorderly conduct statute was
derived.' 67 In the 1990 case of People v. Blanchette,'" subsection
three of New York's disorderly conduct statute was held unconstitutional.1 69 Although the Blanchette decision was enunciated by a
New York city court, it was controlled by the case of People v.
"offensive to one's feelings, or to prevailing notions, of modesty or decency; lewd ...
disgusting; repulsive." Id. at 981. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-01(4) (1985 &
Supp. 1989) (defining "obscene material" and "obscene performance," as requiring an
"appeal[] to a prurient interest").
164. Compare City of Bismarck v. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d 789, 792-94 (N.D. 1989), supra
note 122 with N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-01(3) (1985) (as it facially exists):
Disorderly conduct. A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, with
intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person or in reckless disregard of the
fact that another person is harassed, annoyed, or alarmed by his behavior, he:
3. In a public place, uses abusive or obscene language, or makes an obscene
gesture[.]
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-01(3) (1985). See Hill, 482 U.S. at 471 n.22 (construction of
ordinance must be self-evident to avoid vagueness). Cf. TRIBE, supra note 37, § 12-29, at
1030 (statute must unambiguously proscribe only speech that is unprotected).
165. Johnson, 417 N.W.2d at 368. Since a "person of common intelligence" could
easily include both a lay person and a governmental authority such as a police officer, it is
not enough to simply find a statute vague, rather it must be determined to whom it is
vague. See Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 625, 661 (1984).
166. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 417
U.S. 566, 574 (1974)). The Supreme Court has noted its sensitivity to vague laws that hinder
freedom of speech. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 n.1 (1975) (citing Smith v. Goguen, 417
U.S. 566, 574 (1974)). The Court's solicitude in this respect is perhaps best expressed in
United States v. Reese:
It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large
enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside
and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This
would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of
government.
92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876) (quoted in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 356, 858 n.7 (1983)).
167. See Special Project, supra note 146, at 735 ("The wording of the New Code and
the proposed Federal Code is derived from the New York disorderly conduct statute.").
168. 147 Misc. 2d 50, 554 N.Y.S.2d 388 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990).
169. People v. Blanchette, 147 Misc. 2d 50, _, 554 N.Y.S.2d 388, 390-91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1990) (following People v. Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d 47, 549 N.E.2d 1166, 550 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y.
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Dietze,17 ° in which the New York Court of Appeals declared subsection two of New York's harassment statute unconstitutional. 171
The Dietze court recognized the possibility of curing the statute's
constitutional viruses through judicial construction limiting the
statute to prohibit only "fighting words.' 7 However, in order to
exercise that authority, the Dietze court felt that the "very language of the statute must [first] be fairly susceptible of such an
interpretation.'1

73

Further, and equally critical, the Dietze court

stated that "judicial construction might remedy the overbreadth
of [the] statute, but only at the expense of rendering it unacceptably vague."'1

74

Deciding that to construe a statute under those

circumstances would be contrary to "prudent judicial construction," the Dietze court held subsection two of the statute unconstitutional.17 5 The court in Dietze properly understood that the
1989)). The New York disorderly conduct statute that was held unconstitutional in
Blanchette provided in relevant part:
[A] person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause public
inconvenience,annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof:
3. In a public place, he uses abusive or obscene language or makes an
obscene gesture[.J
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.20(3) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1991). See Blanchette, 147 Misc.
at -, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
170. 75 N.Y.2d 47, 549 N.E.2d 1166, 550 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1989). See Blanchette, 147
Misc. at _, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 390-91.
171. People v. Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d 47, _, 549 N.E.2d 1166, 1169, 550 N.Y.S.2d 595, 598
(N.Y. 1989). Although reluctant, the Blanchette court found it inescapable that the
disorderly conduct statute must be struck down because it was the twin of New York's
harassment statute. See Blanchette, 147 Misc. at , 554 N.Y.S.2d at 391. The subsection of
New York's harassment statute declared unconstitutional in Dietze provided in relevant
part:
[A] person is guilty of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or
alarm another person:
2. In a public place, he uses abusive or obscene language, or makes an
obscene gesture[.]
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.25(2) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1990). Compare id. with N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-01(3) (1985), supra note 165. By comparing New York's harassment
statute with North Dakota's disorderly conduct statute, it is readily ascertainable that the
two are virtually identical. See id.; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25(2), supra. See also N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 240.20(3), supra note 170 (subsection three of New York's disorderly conduct
statute).
172. Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d at -, 549 N.E.2d at 1169, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 598. The court
pointed out that a fair reading of the statute did not even suggest that it was limited to
words or gestures that create an immediate violent reaction. Id. at -, 549 N.E.2d at 1168,
550 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
173. Id. at -, 549 N.E.2d at 1168, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
174. Id. at -, 549 N.E.2d at 1168, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 598. Thus, an ordinary person
would have had to guess as to its meaning. Id.
175. Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d at -_,
549 N.E.2d at 1169, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 598. The court stated
further that if it had construed the statute to be limited to violence-provoking words, "the
statutory language would [then have] signiffied] one thing but, as a matter of judicial
decision, would stand for something entirely different. Id. at -, 549 N.E.2d at 1169, 550
N.Y.S.2d at 598.
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result of such a construction would have chilled free speech and
allowed for continued arbitrary arrests by police officers "strictly
176
enforcing the statute's prohibitions."'

Although the foregoing discussion illustrates that subsection
three of North Dakota's disorderly conduct statute may be constitutionally unsound, the Nassif court's analysis does provide some
novel guidance for subsequent "fighting words" convictions in
North Dakota. 177 Specifically, it appears that the court may have
adopted Justice Powell's position in Lewis v. City of New Orleans 178 which requires a police officer to exercise a higher degree
of restraint when being verbally challenged or criticized by a citizen. 17 The court's opinion appears to evince this requirement;
the discussion recognizes first the traditional "fighting words" language used in Chaplinsky8 0 and Cohen,'18

and then, after

acknowledging Nassif's contention that police officers are
expected to restrain to a higher degree than normal citizens, the
court held that Nassif's words were sufficient to produce a "clear
176. See id. The Chief Justice of the New York Court of Appeals disagreed with the
majority's holding. Id. at -, 549 N.E.2d at 1170, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 599 (Walchter, C.J.,
concurring). He believed that saving constructions should be implicitly read into statutes,
and that citizens should be charged with knowledge of such constructions. Id. at -, 549
N.E.2d at 1171-72, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 600-01. However, a conflict exists in his logic because he
initially stated that the New York Court of Appeals had held that the statute did not apply
to such vulgar words as "Fuck." Id. at -, 549 N.E.2d at 1170, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 599 (citations
omitted). However, in the case the court was deciding, the defendant had been arrested for
calling someone a "bitch" and a "pig." Id. at -, 549 N.E.2d at 1170, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
Thus, the Chief Justice of the New York Court of Appeals was implicitly admitting that the
statute was being used for unauthorized arrests of people who were exercising their first
amendment rights lawfully under that court's construction of the statute. Id. at -, 549
N.E.2d at 170-71, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 599-600. Arbitrary arrests are the predominate reason
why vague laws are held unconstitutional. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58
(1983) (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)) (vague laws permit arbitrary
enforcement by police officers).
Additional evidence indicating that subsection three of North Dakota's disorderly
conduct statute is ambiguous and unclear on its face is the recent case of City of Bismarck v.
Schoppert, 450 N.W.2d 757 (N.D. 1990), in which the defendant was arrested under the
same Bismarck City ordinance as Nassif. City of Bismarck v. Schoppert, 450 N.W.2d 757,
758 (N.D. 1990). Ironically, Schoppert asserted that subsection three of the Bismarck
ordinance superseded state law, id. at 757, just as Nassif had asserted. Nassif,449 N.W.2d at
793. The North Dakota Supreme Court then explained that the ordinance "literally
expresses what the state statute must be construed to include to be constitutional."
Schoppert, 450 N.W.2d at 758 (quoting Bismarck v. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d 789, 794 (1989)).
177. See State v. Miller, 388 N.W.2d 522, 522-23 (N.D. 1986) (defendant's request to
narrowly construe section 12.1-31-01 of the North Dakota Century Code was denied
because the issue was not properly raised at trial). The Miller court denied Miller's request
because his argument revealed that he had made a tactical decision at trial not to assert the
constitutional issue of the statute, but rather, chose to deny the conduct for which he was
charged. Id. at 522-23. See also State v. Laufenburg, 99 N.W.2d 331, 332 (N.D. 1959)
(decision encompassed conduct, not speech).
178. 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
179. Nass'f, 449 N.W.2d at 795 (quoting City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461
(1987), quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
180. Id. at 794 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 569, 572 (1942)).
181. Id. (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971)).
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and present danger of a serious substantive evil."' 8 2 Therefore,
although the court fails to expressly adopt Justice Powell's standard, neither does the court expressly deny it.'8 The progressive
position that the Nassif court may have adopted would be similar
to the recent Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals case of Buffiins v.
City of Omaha184 which held, as a matter of law, that directing
the word "asshole" toward two police officers was not probable
cause for a "fighting words" arrest.'8 5
182. Id. at 794-95 (quoting City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987), quoting
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
183. See Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 794-95. If the Nassifcourt did not agree with Justice
Powell's position, it could have specifically held that Nassif's words constituted "fighting
words" under the traditional standard. See State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, -, 363 N.W.2d
507, 510 (1985) (specifically rejecting Justice Powell's position); State v. Boss, 195 Neb. 467,
-,
238 N.W.2d 639, 643 (1976) (same).
184. 922 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1990). Justice Powell's standard has substantial merit and is
consistent with other Supreme Court decisions that have held that promoting respect for
law enforcement officer's is not justifiable when done at the expense of inhibiting freedom
of speech. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 467 (1987) (Texas statute proscribing
obstruction of a police officer overbroad); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,519-20 n.1 (1972)
(Court affirmed a finding that Georgia's disorderly conduct statute was unconstitutionally
overbroad and vague in context of calling a police officer a "white son of a bitch"). See also
Gard, supra note 18, at 557 (promoting respect for law enforcement can not be justified by
proscribing offensive language). A police officer is trained to keep, not breach, the public
peace. Id. at 556.
185. Buffkins v. City of Omaha, 922 F.2d 465, 472 (8th Cir. 1990). See also Duran v.
City of Douglas, 904 F.2d 1372, 1377 (9th Cir. 1990) (using obscene gestures and language
toward police officer was disgraceful, but not illegal) (citing City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S.
451, 461-63 (1987)). Buflkins involved a defendant who had her luggage searched by two
police officers who suspected the luggage contained cocaine. Buflkins, 922 F.2d at 467.
After searching the luggage, the officers told Buffkins that she was free to leave and to
"have a nice day," to which she responded, "I will have a nice day, asshole." Id. The
Buffkins court recognized that the first amendment protects individuals who are verbally
challenging and criticizing police officers, and that the "use of the word 'asshole' could not
reasonably have prompted a violent response from the arresting officers." Id. at 472 (citing
City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462 (1987)).
It is ironic that at the same time the "fighting words" exception to free speech is being
narrowed to the point of nonexistence, the country is experiencing an increase in the very
insults and epithets for which the exception arguably was created. See Strossen, supra note
8, at 512. These incidents include:
A flyer proclaiming "open season on Blacks" and referring to blacks as
"saucer lips, porch monkeys and jigaboos" is slipped under the door of a
dormitory lounge where black students are meeting. A black student hurls anti
Semitic insults at a Jewish student, including "dirty Jew," "stupid Jews," and
"fucking Jew." The Jewish Student Union at Memphis State University is spraypainted with swastikas and the words "Hitler is God." Asian-American students
are harassed and spat on and a member of the Asian Pacific American Law
Students Association finds a laundry ticket on that club's bulletin board.
Members of a fraternity burst into an African Languages and Literature
classroom, yelling racist remarks and disrupting the class. Two white men taunt
a black woman student as she walks past a university residence hail, and pour
urine on her as they lean out their dormitory room window.
Note, The Call for Campus Conduct Policies: Censorshipor ConstitutionallyPermissible Limitations on Speech, 75 MINN. L. REV. 201, 201 (1990) (citations omitted). North
Dakota campuses are no exception. See Menge, Gay haters scar campus, Dakota Student,
Oct. 16, 1990, at 1, col.5. On the University of North Dakota campus, anti-homosexual
messages such as "all fags deserve to die," "Anti-anal Day," and "Oct. 12, National Back in
the Closet Day" were chalked on the sidewalks, apparently responding to the October 11
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The Nassif opinion also provides a novel and interesting definition of what constitutes a public place in the context of a "fighting words" conviction. In effect, the court adopted the view that
the offense occurs at the place where the words are received, not
where they are spoken. 18 6 Therefore, in North Dakota, a person
National Coming Out Day observed by the Campus' Organization for Alternative Lifestyles. Id.
Hate or biased speech is invoked by resentment and hostility against such characteristics as "race, religion, sexual orientation, ethnicity, or national origin." Note, supra at 20708. These types of utterances are similar to traditional "fighting words" characterizations.
Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Pmtected Speech?, 42 RUTGERs L. REV. 287,
298 (1990); Strossen, supra note 18, at 512. Greenawalt notes that broad prohibitions,
designed merely to proscribe hurtful or humiliating words, should be judged unconstitutional. Greenawalt, supra, at 298. However, he states further that penalties would be in
order if contact was initiated with a person specifically to harass her or him, or when the
speech is used to preclude a person from experiencing rights which are legally protected.
Id. at 298-99. Thus, with first amendment principles in mind, many universities are
promulgating, or, are on the verge of promulgating, anti-hate or harassment codes. Note,
supra, at 202 n.9. However, universities enacting such policies must be cautious not to
impinge students' first amendment rights, a consideration the University of Michigan
became cognizant of when a federal district court permanently enjoined it from enforcing
its anti-harassment policy. Doe v. Univ. of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 863 (E.D. Mich.
1989).
The broad University of Michigan policy considered in Doe sanctioned persons who
stigmatized or victimized individuals or groups based on such characteristics as, among
others, race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, ethnicity, creed, ancestry,
handicaps. Id. at 853. Doe, a graduate student in psychology, challenged the statute, fearing that certain discussions concerning topics positing biological differences between the
sexes might lead to sanctions under the policy. Id. at 858. Asserting that the policy impermissibly chilled open discussion, Doe requested that the district court declare the policy
unconstitutional on the grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. Id. After reviewing three
instances in which university administrators failed to consider the students' first amendment privileges before applying sanctions under the code, the court found it clear that the
code was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague, on its face, and as applied. Id. at 866.
The Doe court noted, however, that under certain circumstances, the epithets, slurs, and
insults prohibited by the policy might fall within the narrow description of "fighting words"
and could then be sanctioned properly by the university. Id. at 862. But see Strossen, supra
note 18, at 509-11 ("fighting words" doctrine no longer good law, specifically in context of
racial slurs). For an effective illustration of the conflict between regulating hate and/or bias
speech in order to promote equality, and allowing such utterances in order to allow freedom of speech, see Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L. REv. 431, 434-35 nn.18-21 (1990) and accompanying text.
186. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 795-96 (bystanders who were located on public property
may have heard Nassif, and therefore the offense occurred in a public place). An important
point the Nassifcourt did not consider when it relied on State v. Leonard, 255 Iowa 1365,
124 N.W.2d 429 (1963), was that the Iowa Supreme Court found that a person in the main
office of the city building had inadvertently overheard an obscene caller's conversation.
Leonard, 255 Iowa at -, 124 N.W.2d at 433. The distinction between the Leonard facts
and the facts in Nassifis that the 20 or 25 bystanders who overheard what Nassif said, did so
intentionally, rather than inadvertently, by "gatherfing]around the area of the incident."
Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 795 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Nassif court has essentially
removed the public place element of the offense. See id. The court now appears to allow
people who want to be bombarded by offensive language to create the "public place"
element for the person who is arrested. See id. The Nassifcourt could have required those
people who eavesdropped willingly on Nassif's business to simply "avert" their ears to
further bombardment by walking away, if they found Nassif's language unpalatable. See
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). Requiring this would have been similar to the
Cohen holding in which the Supreme Court stated that people who were offended by
Cohen's "fuck the draft" jacket could merely avoid further bombardment to their
sensibilities by averting their eyes. Id. at 21. The Cohen Court has also stressed that people
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located on private property can be arrested for disorderly conduct

on public property who
if his words are heard by someone located
7
is not the addressee of the words.'1
Thus, nearly fifty years after the United States Supreme Court
defined "fighting words" and found them to be wholly unprotected by the first amendment, s88 the North Dakota Supreme
Court has attempted to construe subsection three of North

Dakota's disorderly conduct statute to be in accordance with that
definition.' 89 However, it appears that the court may have failed
in its attempt because it construed the statute to prohibit words

that merely "inflict injury," rather than those that incite immediate violent reaction from the person to whom they are
addressed. 190 In addition, and despite the Nassif court's construction, subsection three of the statute may simply lack the explicit

wording required of a statute that infringes on the cherished right
of free speech.' 9 ' In the future, legislatures and courts intending
to proscribe speech that is encompassed by the narrow "fighting
words" exception should do so under statutes and ordinances that
are drafted and construed precisely to limit only speech that
causes immediate violent reaction from the addressee.' 9 2 Only

then will the individual's right to free speech be given the full pro93
tection guaranteed by the first amendment to our Constitution.'
Charles A. Stock

are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable
speech." Id. (quoting Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970)).
187. See Nassif,449 N.W.2d at 795-96 (Nassif was speaking to police officers but people
on sidewalks may have heard him, therefore he committed disorderly conduct in a public
place even though he was located on private property).
188. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
189. See Nassif, 449 N.W.2d at 794-95.
190. Gard, supra note 18, at 536-37.
191. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2904(AX3) (1989), supra note 160 (precisely drawn
statute).
192. See Strossen, supra note 18, at 508-11 (Chaplinsky has been narrowed to limit
speech that incites immediate breach of the peace); Gard, supra note 18, at 533
(Chaplinsky prohibits only words that cause violent response).
193. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech"). However, perhaps the "fighting words" exception to free speech is simply
obsolete. See Strossen, supra note 18, at 510-11 (Chaplinsky is no longer good law); Gard,
supra note 18, at 581 ("fighting words" exception cannot withstand first amendment
protections); Shea, supra note 27, at 1-2 ("fighting words" are protected speech).

